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INTRODUCTION

The most telling observation about "legal adjustment to urbanization," the
assigned topic for this essay, is to note that the basic problems created by urbanization
are political and constitutional.' The problems are "legal" in the gross sense that all
politics and all constitutionalism are part of law. And they are the problems of the
"city" in the broad sociological sense. In this sense "city" encompasses the urbansuburban cultural whole, through which the city line runs as an artificial barrier
separating homes from jobs, capacity from need, leaders from followers, managers
from workers, white from black, the affluent from the poor.2 This is the true
segregation problem for late Twentieth Century America. It calls for a new urban
"politics of integration," to be reflected in a new civic constitution or charter for an
expanded and re-integrated "city."
Concededly some of the contrasts suggested above are grossly overdrawn. But
they do suggest that the common legal concept of a city as that territory bounded
by a city line is a bankrupt concept. It may be as outmoded for 1965 as the military
technology of 1945, but it is not as easy to scrap city hall and make a fresh start
as it is to scrap a Flying Fortress.
Cities, in the grand sense, are for people-all the people; and the problems of the
people are the problems of the cityY If the Grecian concern for the good life, conceived of as a participatingcitizenship in a unified social setting, has any modern
locus for the great bulk of Americans it is in the metropolitanized community. It
is here that are centered our problems, our concerns, and our opportunities in regard
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to housing, education, employment, health, culture, sport, transportation, civil rights
and liberties, morality, religion, family life, and even recreation. Despite the laments
for the passing of the small town, there is a surprising amount of community feeling
in urban America. 4 Spreading over several local jurisdictions and even crossing state
lines5 there is a New York community, a Philadelphia community, a Washington
community, a Chicago community, a St. Louis community. The list could be multiplied by running through the Bureau of the Census list of "standard metropolitan
statistical areas." Most of the pressing problems of modern government-minus
foreign relations, defense, and some aspects of interstate business-center in these
6
areas.
SUBURBAN POLITICS AND STRUCTURE

The political and constitutional problems of urbanization appear in particularly
acute form in suburban America. Suburbia tends to be a conglomeration of special

districts, towns and villages, and unorganized subdivisions. This mass is held together and serviced in varying degrees by the county and is subject occasionally to
extraterritorial powers of the central city. Much of suburbia tends to be a postWorld War II phenomena.
In the initial postwar flush, when new suburbia was truly like a new frontier,
there was a revival of the frontier tradition of self-help, civic work, eager cooperation,
and extroverted neighborliness. In many areas the political and governmental vacuum
was filled by subdivision citizens' associations, which combined to form civic federa7
tions.
'This statement refers to the sense of urban identity that people tend to have, and does not imply
either a sense of satisfaction or harmony. Of dissatisfaction and disharmony there is ample evidence,
going right down to the elementals of life. See, e.g., the New York police report that 34 middle-class
residents watched a killer stalk Catherine Genovese for 30 minutes before he killed her, Washington Post,
March 28, 1964, p. 3, col. I; and the recent formation of private night guards in Brooklyn, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1965, p. 34, col. 4. See also Ward, "The City May Be as Lethal as the Bomb," N.Y. Times
Magazine, April 19, 1964, p. 22.
'Interstate metropolitan regionalism raises special problems and is not treated here. See JoHN M.
WINTERS, INTERSTATE METROPOLITAN AREAS (i962); Dixon, Constitutional Bases for Regionalism:
Centralization; Interstate Compacts; Federal Regional Taxation, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 47 (1964);
Gove & Silverstein, Political Representation and Interstate Urban 4gencies, 17 ILL. Gov"r 1 (1963).
6The 216 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (central city of 5o,ooo or more plus surrounding
territory) comprise 64% of the total United States population, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 14-15, 17 (x964).
President Lyndon B. Johnson's message to Congress on housing and cities, March 2, 1965, proposed a
number of programs "designed to help us begin to think and act across boundaries to enrich the life
of the
people of our metropolitan areas." N.Y. Times, March 3, x965, P. 30, col. 3.
7
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The accomplishments of this amateur, voluntary government of citizens' associations are not to be minimized. Zoning battles were fought, and often won, to keep
gas stations, soft drink bottling plants, or dog and cat hospitals from entering
residential areas. (My own community in Montgomery County, Maryland, a suburb
of Washington, D. C., fought and won each of the battles mentioned.) Churches
were built, scouting activities proliferated, softball teams and leagues were organized.
Shopping centers, bowling alleys, and small industry followed.
As the postwar years lengthened, however, the informal suburban government of
citizens' associations faltered. Unpaid enthusiasm, a disposition to sacrifice endless
evenings, a self-less dedication to civic betterment, cannot be maintained indefinitely.
In part this form of "government" fell victim to its own success, and to the relative
stabilization of suburbia. Zoning battles-and the intense community loyalty they
induce in the average suburban dweller-receded as unoccupied land became scarce.
And with the pressure of other community activities in the increasingly urbanized
suburb, attendance at a civic association meeting, or hard work on a civic association committee, fell from first place to last place on an ever-lengthening list.
In short, the time came for the professionals, i.e., the politicians, who can develop
a career interest in government, to take over. Few places, however, have met the
challenge to create a party-government structure out of formless suburbia, and to
develop appropriate links to the core city. Suburbia seems still to be going through
a period comparable to the national experience of the I79os. Then the tired volun-

teers of the war period, the confederation period, the constitutional convention
period, and the constitutional ratification period, finally shook down into identifiable
and responsible political parties with a few readily identifiable and responsible fulltime leaders. Suburbia is still searching. To the question, "who governs suburbia?,"
or even "who speaks for suburbia?," there is still no answer.
The political party is not only the vehicle for providing professionals to man vital
civic and governmental posts. More importantly it also can be the means for
shaping and channeling public opinion and making the public debate on issues and
programs sharper. The virtues both of responsiveness and responsibility can be
gained. The formlessness of a civic association and a federation of civic associations
is inadequate to the task of providing continuous surveillance in communities of
hundreds of thousands of people spread over masses of territory part of which is
balkanized into towns and subcities, and part of which is unorganized and is relying
on the county, the special tax district, and service contracts.
II
A METROPOLITAN CoNSTITUTION
The problem of constitutionalizing suburbia and of integrating it with the core
city is in part a political party problem, because the need is not to further incorporate
NEEDED:

775 (1964); O. P. WLLmis & Cs-ms. R. ADwAN, Four CrEs (1963); EDwARD C. BtAFxaw & J. 0.
WILSON, CTY PoLIrIcs (1963).
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and further balkanize suburbia but to develop suburban-wide and metropolitanarea-wide political outlook, with appropriate political leaders and political organization. Political leaders, of course, must be tied to some elective posts. We have
learned from the international field the impossibility of creating international law
and politics without an international government.
However, as in the international field by analogy, it has proven to be easier
to suggest the creation of metropolitan-area-wide (metro) elective positions than to
accomplish the feat in fact. Metropolitan area government in the form of a citycounty consolidation, or a city-county federal division of functions, or a superimposed
"metro" government to handle designated functions, has had little appeal when submitted to popular referenda. The victories in Dade County (Miami) Florida, and
Nashville and Knoxville in Tennessee are offset by a string of defeats in St. Louis,
Cleveland, Seattle (a reduced one-function agency was later approved), and else
where.8
The "metro" concept, however, apart from some of the forms by which it is
sought to be advanced, is basically sound. It is simply one more manifestation of
the age-old trend toward "centralization of power," defined as the transfer of effective
power of political decision to higher governmental levels encompassing wider
geograpbic area Centralization of power, thus defined as a descriptive rather than
a pejorative term, has innumerable examples in world history going at least as far
back as the shift from the Greek city-state to the amalgam that was Rome. Rome
was viable, the Greek city-state was not. Similarly in the metropolitan area, the
village and township, and a fortiori the unorganized subdivision, show little
viability. Even when centralized units have broken up, as in the disintegration of
the Roman Empire into decentralized quarreling feudalism, a recentralization of
power in turn was prerequisite to successful emergence from feudalism. Examples
could be multiplied, but the lesson that emerges is that centralization of power seems
to be a price of efficient utilization of resources and technology.
Opponents of "metro" developments and other attempts to constitutionalize our
urbanization are often moved by fears of losing "democracy" and "freedom." These
values, however, do not have a primary relationship to centralization of power, which
is really only a concept of power in relation to area.10 Democracy and free8

See ScoTT A. GREER, METROpOLITICS (1963); U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, FACTORS AFFEcTING VOTER REAnTIONs TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATIONi IN METROPOLITAN
AEAS (1962); EDWARD SoFEN, THE MIAMI METROPOLITAN EXPERIMENT (1963).
'The centralization theme and its relation to technology is developed further in Dixon, Constitutional

Bases for Regionalism: Centralization;Interstate Compacts; Federal Regional Taxation, 33 GEO. WASH. L.
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(1941).
o Provocative essays on "areal division of power" and its relation to the base values of liberty, equality
and welfare are contained in ARTm-m MAss (En.), AREA AND POWER: A THEORY OP LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(1959).
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OF URBAN FuNCTIONS: LOcAL AND AREAWiDE (x963); ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL
REORGANIZATION
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dom relate primarily to the degree of concentration of power, and the manner of
legitimization of power, within the system, whether it be centralized or decentralized.
Power can be "legitimized" by force alone or by a free election system, and in the
latter many choices are open in regard to frequency of elections, staggering of terms,
and so forth. And power can be "concentrated" in an executive head, or in a legislature, or be shared in various fashions between the two.
At bottom "centralization" is no more than an attempt rationally to relate governmental forms and institutions to the geographic breadth of the public need for
uniform regulations and minimum service standards. The problem in the i96os and
1970s is to find a unified and constitutionalized governmental home for metropolitan
man. A similar problem on a national scale existed in 1787 and the answer was
the centralization of power document known as the United States Constitution. And
just as the responsiveness of corporate management is not causally related (at least
directly) to the degree of geographic spread or intercorporate connections of the
corporation, so the responsiveness of government is not causally related to the kind
of areal division of power which prevails at any given time. A centralized government-a metro-can be a responsible and responsive government. And a decentralized government with authority for various functions distributed among
town, city, and county-and with some large vacuums-can yield irresponsibility
as well as diffusion of power.
III
ALTF.RNATIVE APPRoACHES

There has been no dearth of writing on metropolitan area problems and of
suggested solutions. Indeed, whole bibliographies are devoted to keeping up with the
flow.'1 For the limited purpose of the present essay it is important only to note the
'T See, e.g., the continuing bibliographies included as part
and Digest; the Government Affairs Institute bibliography; the
and House Subcommittees on Intergovernmental Relations of the
the notes and bibliographies published regularly in the National

of Metropolitan Area Problems, News
bibliographies published by the Senate
Committees on Government Operations;
Civic Review.

See OTIS DUNCAN AND OTHEs, METROPOLIS AND REGION (ig6o); LUTaER H. GULICK, THE METROPOLPROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS 1-27 (1962); HARVEY S. PmuLOFF AND OTHERS, REGIONS, RESOURCES,
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See also Ely, Intergovernmental Cooperation Trends, Loc. GOV'T L. SERv. LETTER, Vol. 14,
No. 5 (May 1964); Beckman, Alternative Approaches for Metropolitan Reorganization, 92 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 55 (x964); JOINT CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES, MIT AND HARVARD UNIV., THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING,

FOR SENATE Coamm.
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88TH CONG., 2D SESS.
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Print 1963); Joint Hearings on Government in Metropolitan Areas Before Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate and House Committees on Government Operations, 88th Cong., ist Sess.
(1963); Hearings on the Role of the Federal Government in Metropolitan Areas Before Senate Sub-

committee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 87 th
Cong., 2d Ses. (1962); U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, GOVERNMENTAL
STuCTtRE, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, 87TH CONG., is-r Sass. (Comm. Print 1961); STATE UNIVERSITY OP NEW YORK, GRADUATE
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variety of possible approaches. A recent study published by the Housing and Home
Finance Agency (HHFA) lists eight devices for "procedural adaptation," ranked
by degree of impact as follows:"2
i.

Informal cooperation, e.g., the sharing of police teletype, intelligence, or equip-

ment.
The service contract for such things as water and sewage disposal, which in Los
Angeles County has been carried to the point where a city may make a "package
deal" with the county for all municipal services.
3. Parallelaction, i.e., the authorization by "joint powers" legislation for local governments to enter into agreements for joint performance of any function which the
cooperating governments have the power to undertake individually.
4. The conference approach, i.e., a metropolitan regional council of governments
composed of elected officials from the local governments within the metropolitan
region, meeting regularly to work out patterns of cooperation, standard ordinances,
and so forth.

2.

5. The compact, ie., a formalization of No. i above, such as the agreement between

two counties in Kentucky to form the Northern Kentucky Area Planning Commission. Major problems across state lines can be handled only by interstate compact, but inter-local agreements to formalize cooperative action on lesser problems
have been authorized in New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey.
6. Transfer of functions, usually on a limited ad hoc basis, such as transfer to the
county of responsibility for suburban water problems.
7. Extraterritorialjurisdiction, i.e., state authorization for cities to establish facilities
outside their limits for water supply, sewage, recreation.
8. Incorporation, i.e., the creation of a new municipality.
2

" U.S. HOUSING AND HoME FINANCE AGENCY (Martin), METROPOLIS IN TRANSITION 5-8 (1963).

This

work also includes a selected topical bibliography, confined largely to governmental or political science
sources.
See the following reports of U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations:
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION

IN METROPOLITAN

AREAS (1962); GOV-

ERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (196); SUGoE-rS
ACTION By LOCAL, STATE, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS (1961); STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL, AND PERSONNEL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(x962); THE PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DIsTIuCTs IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1964); and reports cited
in notes 8 and xo supra.
See the following titles in Universtiy of Michigan Law School Series, Legal Problems in Metropolitan

Areas:
JOHN M.

FRANK S. SENOsTocx, ANNEXATION:

A

SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROILEM

(1960);

WINTERS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SOLUTIONS OF METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS

(196I); NEI. LITTLEFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1962); MAX A.
POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM (1962);
FRANK S. SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRITORIAL PowERS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA (1962); JOHN M. WINTERS,
THE INTERSTATE METROPOLITAN AREA (1962); LARRY M. ELIsON, THE FINANCES OF METROPOLITAN

AREAS (1964).
See also WINSTON W. CROUCH & BEATRICE DINERMAN, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA METROPOLIS:
IN DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT POR A METROPOLITAN AREA (1963); Owsley, Kentucly

Cooperation Act, 51 Ky. L.

J.

A STUDY
Interlocal

22 (1962); FRANK S. SENGsTOCK AND OTHERS, CoNSOLIDATION: BUILDINO

a BRIDGE BETWEEN CITY AND SUBURB (x964); Donoghue, County Government and Urban Growth, 1959
Wis. L. REv. 30; Grubbs, Legal Aspects of City-County Consolidation in Tennessee, 3o TENN. L. REV.
499 (1963); N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT COOPERATION (x963).
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The HHFA study also goes on to list eight devices for "structural adaptation,"
ranked by degree of impact as follows:13

i. Annexation, i.e., the extension of the city boundary to include unincorporated
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

fringe areas.
City-county separation, i.e., the reconstitution of a major city as a separated citycounty. Prior to i9o2 Baltimore, Denver, St. Louis, and San Francisco received
this treatment. Today the practice exists only as an oddity in Virginia, where
the separation practice is a constant threat to the continued viability of the counties.
Geographical consolidation, i.e., the relatively infrequent practice of city-city
consolidation, city-county consolidation, etc. After the nineteenth century consolidations involving Boston, Philadelphia, New Orleans, and New York, there
was a a long lull. A recent major consolidation involves Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee.
Functional consolidation. Although classified separately in the HHFA study
this seems to be merely a "structural" way of looking at some "procedural" adaptations already listed above, e.g., parallel or joint action, a compact, transfer of functions.
The special district, i.e., the creation of single-purpose or multi-purpose districts
for schools, water, sewage, etc. Special districts normally have taxing power but
not power to issue revenue bonds.
The authority, i.e., the creation of a public agency in the fields of housing, mass
transit, etc. The "authority" normally differs from the "special district" in lacking
a tax power and possessing instead a power to issue revenue bonds, defrayed by
user charges.
Metropolitan government, i.e., the creation through consolidation, massive transfer
of functions to the county, or special charter of a general purpose governmental
unit with jurisdiction throughout the metropolitan area.
The regional agency, i.e., the creation of a special purpose supra-metropolitan
agency to handle problems such as water supply and transportation which extend
beyond a single metropolitan area. Most examples involve interstate compacts,
e.g., the recently created Delaware River Basin Commission.

A similar list is contained in a 1962 study by the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, but with fewer overlapping headings so
that ten alternatives emerge:
i. Use of extraterritorial powers.
2. Intergovernmental agreements.
3. Voluntary "metropolitan councils."
4. The urban county.
cit. supra note

" U.S. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE (Martin), op.
4
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cit. supra note

1o, at ch. IV.

i.

REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS,

op.
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5. Transfer of functions to the state government. (This is a heading not included in
the HHFA list.)
6. Metropolitan special districts: limited purpose and multipurpose.
7. Annexation and consolidation.
8. City-county separation.
9. City-county consolidation.
in. Federation (borough plan), i.e., a species of local "federalism" with some func-.
tions continued in local units and some vested in a metropolitan-area-wide agency.
In an unplanned way, such a federal or borough arrangement already may exist
in most states which have city, village, or township units operating within counties.
Few of these devices are mutually exclusive, and many are supportive of each
other. Many of them, however, are not devices, or even important stepping-stones,
toward true metropolitan government, e.g., extraterritorial jurisdiction of cities,
service contracts, special districts, public authorities. They do not envision a broad
metropolitan-area-wide government in which metropolitan man can become a
metropolitan citizen and acquire a direct voter relationship between himself and
a set of officials performing at least a goodly number of metropolitan functions.

IV
THE

PROBLEM OF BOUNDARIES

Central to any discussion of re-constituting our urban areas is the problem of
boundaries. The lines, which also denote important jurisdictional allocations, can
be created by incorporation of municipalities or special districts, can be extended by
annexation or consolidation, and can be ignored or surmounted by such devices
as extraterritorial powers and service contracts.
In all cases of establishment of boundaries the central problem, and the most
unprovided for problem, is the general lack of any power of review of the basic
determination of whether or not to establish the boundary. Under incorporation "
and annexation' 6 statutes, courts of course do review to ensure that various formalities
have been met. But the basic political decision to establish the boundary-and it is
a political decision, and therefore not properly delegable to a court"7 --normally is
" Mandelker, Municipal Incorporation on the Urban Fringe: Procedures for Determination and
Review, z8 LAt.L. REv. 628 (1958); Mandelker, Standards for Municipal Incorporations on the Urban

Fringe,36 TExAs L.

REV.

271 (1958).

"0FRANK S. SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM (1960);

RoBErT G. DIxoN, JR. & JoHN R. KERSTETTER, ADJUSTING MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES: TAE LAw & PRACrIcE
IN 48 STATES (i959). See also Note, Stumbling Giants-A Path to Progress Through Metropolitan Annexation, 32 No'm DMtE LAw. 56 (x963).
"T This is certainly the dominant view in the states. For individual states see comments in DixoN &
KERSTErER, op. cit. supra note i6, as follows: Ark. 54; Idaho 96; Ill. 1o2; Ind. 114; Kan. 126; Ky. 134;
La. 143; Mich. z59; Minn. 175; Miss. 182; Mo. 186; Mont. 193; Nebr. 197; Nev. 205; N.Y. 259;
N.C. 226; Okla. 242; Ore. 248; Pa. 258; S.C. 271; S.D. 276; Tenn. 281; Tex. 29r; Utah 299; Va. 307;
W. Va. 326; Wyo. 339In regard to federal review, the "political question" doctrine has been applied and it has been held
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left in the hands of the immediately interested parties. As a result a city may be
hemmed in, and find annexation pathways blocked, by defensive incorporations on
the urban fringe. Uneconomic units may be created for lack of adequate information. At the very least an unplanned, spasmodically created, checkerboard of overlapping local units and districts results. Many of our traditional arrangements,
unfortunately, put a premium on pettiness and parochialism.
Recently some restraints have been applied to the casual process of creating and
changing local boundaries. Some annexation-incorporation statutes have been
amended to impose additional standards, e.g., to forbid, without consent of the city,
an incorporation within a designated number of miles from the existing city boundary. 8 More grandiose are the provisions for local boundary commissions. Examples include Minnesota,1 9 Alaska, 20 and California. 2 ' The purpose of such comthat incorporations-annexations do not present justiciable federal questions. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. x61 (1907); Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 (i9oo); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881);
Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, Ion U.S. 514 (1879); Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners
of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (875); Clay v. Eustis, 7 F.2d 141 (S.D. Fla. 1925), appeal dismissed,
273 U.S. 781 (1926); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 5o6 (1897) (semble). A recent dismissal for
want of a federal question seems to reinforce this federal line of authority. Texas ex rel. Pan American
Production Co. v. Texas City, 157 Tex. 450, 303 S.W.2d 780 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 603
(1958).
However, there is a line of cases which may seem to be inconsistent with the Hunter line of precedent,
suggesting that abuse of power in special district annexations would present a reviewable federal
question. See Houck v. Little River District, 239 U.S. 254 (9I5), Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage
District, 239 U.S. 478 (1916), and discussion in Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court:
1957 Term, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 315-17 (1959). A distinction which could be suggested is that
a review merely for the purpose of enforcing some due process "grundnorms" of fairness is not inconsistent
with a rule of non-reviewability of the basic decision to incorporate or annex. The due process grundnorms merely would indicate the price of going forward with the political decision.
8

" E.g., IOWA CoDE ch. 362.1 (1962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 11-9711, 11-551 (i96i); TENN. CODE
ANN. ch. 6-io5, 6-1803 (Supp. 1964). For discussion of this and related matters, see DIxoN & KRSTETrER, op. cit. supra note i6, at 115, 122, 244, 283, and index references generally on individual
state provisions regarding standards of annexability, special districts, revisions proposed or enacted, etc.
See also Beckman & Brazer, Governments Galore: Let's Eliminate Incentives for Creating Specific
Districts and Restrict Authority to Incorporate, 52 NAT. Cmy. REv. 132 (1963); Note, New Control over
Municipal Formation and Annexation, 4 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 125 (1963).
" MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 414.01-414.07 (Supp. 1964). Minnesota is the leading example of this
development. For recent comments by Joseph Robbie, Chairman of the Minnesota Municipal Commission,
see Robbie, A State Municipal Boundary Commission Meeting the Need for Administrative Review of
Proposed Incorporations and Annexations Through Impartial State Agency, 37 MICH. Music. REV. 7
(1964); Robbie, Municipal Annexation, as part of report of Committee on Individual Rights of ABA
Section on Local Government Law, Loc. Gov'z L. SERV. LETrER 26 (December 1964, Committee Reports
Supplement). The Commission will have available shortly a report to the legislature covering its first
five years of existence.
A x963 amendment to the Commission's statute allows the people in the affected territory to vote on
annexations approved by the Municipal Commission, thus leaving the Commission with a veto power but
no power to compel annexation against the wishes of the proposed annexees.
" ALASKA CONsT. art. X, § 2; ALASKA STATS. §§ 44.19.250-44.19.340 (1962).
" CAL. GOV'T COnE § 54775-91. The new Local Agency Formation Commission law has been summarized as follows by Robert L. Small, Executive Officer of the San Diego Local Agency Formation
Commission: "The formation commissions were established as a result of 1963 legislation. There are 57
of them in the state of California and they are made up of local officials within each county. The five
members of the commission represent the county government in the person of two county officials,
normally supervisors; city government in the person of two mayors selected by all of the mayors in the
county; and the fifth public member selected by the other four members. The formation commissions
have the power and responsibility for the review of city incorporation, district formation, and city and
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missions is to provide some mechanism for disinterested review, at a level above
the disputing parties, of the factual basis and competing policy considerations which
enter into the creation or modification of local boundaries. The basic theme in
Alaska and Minnesota seems to be that urban and metropolitan restructuring is a
matter of state-wide interest and concern, and must be developed from the perspective
of the entire state. In California the new intra-county Local Agency Formation
Commissions do provide some regional focus and may serve to make local planning
much more realistic.2 2 In other words, home rule is not appropriate until higher
authorities establish the boundaries of the home and resolve jurisdictional contests
between homes.
Althotigh no "right" path to change may exist, the mere existence of such commissions puts on the proponent and opponent of boundary change the onus of thinking deeply about it, and coming up with some reasoned arguments. As all investigatory bodies know, much may result from the mere power to ask the little question
-why?
With the details of this development we are not now concerned. Annexation,
however, is relevant to the "constitutionalizing of metropolis" theme of this essay.
Classified in terms of power of approval of annexation, the modes of annexation
authorized by state law fall roughly into six major categories, and of course some
states lack one or more of the categories. The modes are 23 (1) bilateral annexation,
i.e., after consent of both fringe and city has been expressed by some combination
of petition and election, or petition and ordinance procedures; (2) unilateral
annexation by the city, i.e., full power in the city to accomplish annexation by
the device usually of ordinance or charter amendment; (3)unilateral annexation
by the city subject to judicial remonstrance, i.e., opportunity for the fringe to appeal
to court before annexation becomes final; (4)annexation by court order after initiation either in the city or in the fringe area; (5)annexation by approval of outside
body other than a court; (6) annexation by special act of the state legislature.
For the present purposes the important ones are those under which annexation
may occur without the consent of those being annexed, ie., unilateral annexation or
annexation by judicial order. The latter, judicial annexation, involves a monstrous
violation of the separation of powers tradition of confining courts to "non-political"
activity. 4 There is no "right" to be adjudicated in an annexation case regarding
district annexation proposals prior to circulation of petitions or action by the appropriate local governing
board. The commission does not have jurisdiction over withdrawals of territory from districts or cities
or over the consolidation or dissolution of special districts. The commissions have the power to approve,
disapprove, or approve with modifications or conditions any proposal that comes before them. If a
proposal is disapproved, no proposal involving substantially the same territory may be made for one
year after the commission's original action." Statement of Panel Presentation, National Municipal
League meeting, San Francisco, Nov. 20, 1964, p. X (mimeo.).
"2 As Mr. Small phrased it, id. at 2: "[P]lanning as we have known it, has not given adequate consideration to ultimate or anticipated local governmental jurisdictions."
"5 Adapted from DxxoNr & KaRsraaR, op. dt. supra note 16, and my talk, "Annexation Techniques
and the Judicial Role," before ABA Municipal Law Section, Washington, ig6o.
" Although the dominant view is that annexation by judicial order is both unwise and unconstitutional,
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the basic question of whether or not to annex. It is a decision to be made in terms
of the vision of urban development which prevails in a given area at a given time.

It is a straight policy decision.
Virginia's basic annexation statute is an extreme and well-known example of
annexation by judicial order. It has been aptly referred to as Virginia's "not so
judicial 23 method. A striking feature of the system is the breadth of discretion of
the annexation court 2 It is to determine the ."necessity for and expediency of"
annexation in the light of such considerations as the "best interests" of county, city
or town, and territory; adaptability to city improvements; and the city's needs for
future development. The discretion of the annexation court in Virginia is enhanced
by two additional factors. The judges themselves are empowered to alter the

boundaries as proposed by the initiating party. They also may set forth in the
annexation order such terms as to them seem "fair and reasonable." Virginia's virtual
blank check delegation of annexation power to the courts-like the broad judicial
remonstrance system of Kentucky and IndianaT-would not pass muster in many
courts. The Virginia Court of Appeals came near to the heart of the matter when
it observed that the doctrine of separation of powers, and its corollary principle of
prohibiting conferment on the courts of non-judicial functions, has seldom been
vigorously applied in Virginia. 8
judicial annexation, especially if it is of the broad type practiced in Virginia,
is not even relieved by the "egalitarian" thesis that lends some color of objectivity
to the recent wave of legislative reapportionment cases. Nor is it relieved by any
"necessity" argument which is the true rationale for Baker v. Carr.20 For annexation,
other alternatives than the courts are available.
Unilateral annexation, by contrast, puts controlling power in the hands of the
city, limited to an extent perhaps where there is a boundary commission with
supervening or review authority. Several states authorize a summary procedure of
annexation for specified types of tracts which are relatively innocuous politically,
such as city-owned territory. For years Texas3 ° has been the dominant example of
supra note 17, the practice occurs in a number of states either in direct form (e.g., Virginia) or in
limited form as part of a remonstrance procedure (e.g., Indiana, Kentucky, North Carolina, Missouri, and
Tennessee). For cases see Forsythe v. City of Hammond, 142 Ind. 505, 41 N.E. 950 (895); Kraft
v. City of Louisville, 297 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. X956); Witt v. McCanless, 2oo Tenn. 360, 292 S.W.2d 392
(1956); City of St. Joseph v. Hankinson, 312 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1958). For Virginia, see text accompanying
note 25 infra.

2"Bain, Annexation: Virginia's Not-So-ludicial System, 15 Pun. ADmiN. Rav. 251 (s955). See also
Virginia Annexation Laws Reviewed, 53 NtT. Csv. REv. 267 (1964).
" The leading case is Hnrico County v. City of Richmond, xo6 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (igo6).
27See citations supra note x8.
"sHenrico County v. City of Richmond, supra note 26.
"369 U.S. 186 (1962). Elsewhere I have suggested that in holding in 1962 that legislative
apportionment raised justiciable issues the Court could have used a "necessity-changing times" principle
analogous to the rationale used in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAw & CoNTrEMP. PROB. 328, 354 (x962).
" See City of Houston v. State ex rel. City of West University Place, 142 Tex. 190, 176 S.W.zd 928
(1943); Allen v. City of Austin, ix6 S.W.2d 468 (Texas Civ. App. 1938).
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a broad power of unilateral annexation of all types of adjacent unincorporated territory, and in a few other states certain classes of cities have a similar broad power 8 '
The difficulty with unilateral annexation is two-fold. First, it puts in a part of the
metropolitan area the power of determining the nature of the development of the
entire area. Secondly and more importantly, given the predictable continuance of
the process of urbanization, there is no natural stopping point to the process of
unilateral annexation as Texas experience indicates short of the county line-or the
line of defensive incorporation in the urban fringe. Except for the latter factor of
defensive or pre-emptive incorporation, unilateral annexation envisions cities becoming coterminous with counties.
As a stepping stone to city-county consolidation in the present minority of states
where unilateral annexation is authorized, there may be some virtue in this development. Even in these states, however, the story of past "metro" efforts suggests that
strong opposition may exist to submergence of the county. For the majority of
states, where cities lack unilateral annexation power or already are circled by a
choker necklace of incorporated territory, the annexation route to constitutionalizing
the metropolitan area by building on the base of the central city is impossible.
It would appear then that annexation is a device of limited utility in most states
as a basis for constitutionalizing the metropolitan area. In the minority of states
where it exists as an instrument for vigorous city expansion it logically runs to the
county line. And it thus raises the basic policy question whether the central city
or the county should be the basic building block for the escalation we soon will face
from large metropolis to sprawling metropolitan regionalism.
V
Two SoLuTIoNs
In the perspective of the next twenty-five years the question really is not whether,
but how, metropolitan governmental arrangements within metropolitan areas will
be achieved. It is a political problem, a constitutional problem, and very immediately a human relations and citizen acceptance problem. As noted, most ambitious
"metro" plans have failed to receive voter approval. At least two less ambitious
approaches hold much promise.
Council of Governments Approach. One approach is to build on the existing
elective officials and the existing political party structure, through establishment
of area-wide councils of governments, thus linking the area legislators and political
leaders. Approximately eight examples already exist, including the Association of
Bay Area Governments (San Francisco region) and the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments (National Capitol region).*32 The latter, and the Mid1

Examples include Missouri, Nebraska, and to a lesser extent, Kansas and Idaho.

See generally

Dixom & KEissrTTER, op. dit. supra note 16.

"Others, well established by z962, included the Supervisors Inter-County Committee (Detroit area);
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Willamette Valley Intergovernmental Cooperation Council, have been subjected to
fairly extensive analysis3 3
It is important that these councils be based on the area legislative bodies so that
they will be part of the existing power structure. They should not be mere leagues
or associations of planners. Of the latter there are many examples, but they seem
to solve few problems other than provision of employment for more planners, to
plan the integration of plans previously made? 4 On a local politician-legislator base
the council plans may be less grandiose but the accomplishments will be more enduring. Planning is a necessary adjunct to politics; but the political base may be
established first.
An example is the Year 2o00 Plan for the National Capital Region, which was
completed in i96 and ordered into use by President Kennedy a year later as a guide
for federal agency land-use policies. By 1963, however, it was reasonably clear
that no suburban planning agency, with one possible exception, seriously intended
to use the document as a policy guideline?5
Whether the council is confined to one county, or transcends county lines as in
the case of some existing councils, is a particularized local issue and does not affect
the utility of the council device.
The statements made four or five years ago about the benefits to be derived from
the council of governments movement may have been overly optimisticO8 Three
more recent studies are more reserved. For example it has been pointed out: (I)
that the council's strength in being a body of locally elected politicians is also a weakness because the council's most effective members may be defeated in local elections
Metropolitan Regional Council (New York, New Jersey, Connecticut); Mid-Willamette Valley Intergovernmental Cooperation Council (Salem, Oregon area); Regional Conference of Elected Officials (Philadelphia area); the Puget Sound Governmental Conference (Seattle-Tacoma area); the Baltimore Metropolitan Area Council. See summary and evaluation in U.S. ADVISORY CoMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS,

ALTERNATIVE

APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL

REORGANIZATION

IN

METROPOLITAN

AREAS,

op. cit. supra note 1o, at 34-38.
Private metropolitan affairs nonprofit corporations, such as the Detroit area Metropolitan Fund, Inc.,
may play a supportive role, as discussed in Mathewson, Broader Horizons, 54 NAT. Civ. REv. 136 (1965).
" U.S. HOusING AND HoMtE FINANCE AGENCY (Martin), op. cit. supra note 12, at 27-5o; WASHINGTON
CENTER FOR METROPOLITAN

STUDIES

(Hanson), THm

POLITICS OF METROPOLITAN COOPERATION:

METRO-

(1964).
" At a conference at the Brookings Institution which this writer attended a few years ago the dean
of a school of architecture and planning brought the house down with his remark that the career story
of many city planners was to go from failure to failure right up the ladder of success.
1
WASINGTON CENTER FOR METROPOLITAN STUDIES (Hanson), op. cit. supra note 33, at 68. This
study faults the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments for not acting on the Year 2000 Plan
for two years, by which time non-use of the Plan by the area local governments was becoming clear.
Perhaps the more meaningful observation is that plans prepared outside the political process and presented
to political leaders for ratification will have a cool reception, and that the role of a council of governments is to participate in, or direct, the planning process and not to serve merely as a broker. Such
participation is suggested in this study.
" See Jones, Cooperation Pattern, 51 NAT. Civ. REV. 302 (x962); Leach, New Urban Challenge, 50
NAT. Civ. REV. 480 (1961). For a review of accomplishments see Humes, Washington Area Reports
Progress, 5o NAT. Civ. REv. 55o (1961). Also see Parker, Cooperation in Metropolitan Areas Through
Councils of Government, 65 PUB. MANAGEMENT 223 (1963); Schrader, Voluntary Metropolitan Government Councils, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFICIALS, INFORMATION REPORT No. 161 (1962).
POLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS
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on non-council-related issues; 37 (2) that the rule of unanimity magnifies the veto
power of local interests;"8 (3)that the councils so far operate well only in regard
to noncontroversial problems which can be solved with little cost through decisions
which will be largely self-executing.'
However, the council of governments concept is basically sound. Merely by
existing a council of governments is an achievement of sorts. Unlike planning, which
is mainly a question of money, the creation and operation of a council of governments is an exercise in human relations-political relations-with many of the problems of a United Nations on a local scale. Councils have accomplished some things in
their own right, and they have a major role as a bridge device toward more simplified
and direct forms of political and legal organization for metropolitan areas. A decade
hence much that now seems impossible may be accomplished and appear in retrospect
as the obvious path dictated by human need and political wisdom.
The Reapportioned County. The other approach which seems to merit major
emphasis is to center attention on the county as the chosen instrument for metropolitan salvation. In some areas a form which can be called the "urban county"
already is emerging. Even in those areas where a metropolitan region spreads across
more than one county, the county is the largest available building block and it has
the prime virtue of already being in existence. As noted in one recent study :40
In some 135 of the 212 SMSAs of 1961 [Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of
the Bureau of the Census], however, the metropolitan area lay wholly within the confines
of a single county. Not every county constituting an SMSA is a potential metropolitan
government, but many are. Where the major city lies near the center of the county, where
there is elbow-room for suburban growth, where the county has manifested an awareness
of urban growth and an interest in urban problems, where the county has shown a disposition to municipalize its services-in such a situation the county may be the logical
repository for metropolitan responsibilities.
Of course, there are major obstacles to this development. For years perhaps the
most crucial one-because it has blocked other developments-has been the malapportionment of county boards. As noted in a 1962 report: "A deterrent to transferring more power to counties in some States is the existence of inequitable representation in the governing body, often with the central city and the suburbs on
41
opposite sides of the issue."
(Hanson), op. cit. supra note 33, at 71.
1d. at 70; U.S. ADVISORy COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL PELATIONS, Op. cit. supra note 32,

38 WASHINGTON CENTER FOR METROPOLITAN STUDIES

at 38.
"' U.S. HousING AND HoM FINANcE AGENCY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 48-49.
"U.S. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY (Martin), op. cit. supra note 12, at 89. See also Note,
'Urban County: A Study of New Approaches to Local Government in Metropolitan 4reas, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 526 (xg6o); Grossman, Counties Come to Life, 53 NAT. Cxv. REV. 429 (1964), suggesting that a
newly developed partnership with municipalities is putting counties in a position of leadership.
"U.S. ADvisoRY CoMMISsIoN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, op. cit. supra note 32, at 45, and
see generally the urban county discussion, id. at 38-46 and -references cited therein.
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The primary justification for suggesting at this time that the county be viewed
as a potential, ready-made "metro" unit, lies in recent activities of the United States
Supreme Court and their potential revolutionary impact on the form and quality of
county government and on popular respect for county government. The wave of
legislative reapportionment suits, which are re-making the political map of America
in the wake of Baker v. Cart,2 already have reached the county board level.
Baker, in 1962, authorized judicial entry into the political thicket of state legislative

reapportionment. The culmination of Baker was the Supreme Court ruling in the
Reapportionment Decisions of June 15, I964, 43 that both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be elected from districts of substantially equal population.
Within three months this new equal population districts principle-dubbed "one
man-one vote" by many-was applied to the county board of supervisors by the circuit
court for Kent County, Michigan, in Brouwer v. Bron kema.44 On the Kent County
Board of seventy-three supervisors, drawn from twenty-two townships and eight
cities, per capita representation ranged from a low of one supervisor for 925 people
to a high of one supervisor for i5,oo people. As a rare instance a wide range
between the one largest and the one smallest district may be supportable to provide
some representation to a small, unique, isolated unit. But the average deviation,

which is the more meaningful statistic, was also extreme in Kent County. For only
seven supervisors did the population per capita representation ratio vary by less than
2,ooo from the ideal ratio of 5100. In other words, with a mean of 51oo, the repre-

sentation ratio for all but six supervisors fell outside a range of 310 to 7100.

Because the fourteenth amendment, which is the basis for the Reapportionment
Decisions, applies equally to local and state governments, it is logical that whatever
individual right is found to exist vis-a'-vis the state legislature should exist also in
regard to the local legislature. The path to this conclusion is eased by the Supreme
Court's failure to characterize the right at issue as being one of representation. In
the meaningful, functional sense such characterization would require consideration of

interest and party alignments and the many inequities, riggings, and minority submergence factors which can operate to defeat fair representation, even with equal
population districts. Instead the Court in the ReapportionmentDecisions approached
the matter wholly abstractly as an individual right to something called an "equally
weighted vote," and then indulged in the convenient non sequitur that the right
could be achieved by taking bare census data and arranging it in equal piles, i.e.,
districts4
42 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2

" See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), from Alabama, and the companion cases from New
York, Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, and Colorado.
"Opinion and decision filed Sept. 11, 1964. Unfortunately, this landmark case with a perceptive
opinion is unreported. References hereafter are to photocopy of manuscript opinion.
'"The difficulty with the Court's formulation is that it is an incomplete and overly literal application
of the equal protection clause, not that it is wholly wrong. Population should play a dominant role
in apportionment and districting. The facts of most of the cases decided so far show extreme divergences
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Accordingly, in the Kent County case Judge Searl had little difficulty in finding
for the plaintiff, as follows :46
It is the "supreme law of the land" that each "person" have equal representation in the
legislative body in which the legislative power of the State is exercised and such right

requires that the membership of such body be apportioned on a population basis. A part
of the legislative power of the State is delegated to and exercised by County Boards of
Supervisors. That Board, like its parent body, the State Legislature, must be apportioned
on a population basis if all persons in the County are to have equal representation therein.
He also said, in the specific context of the Michigan case, that it is "not material that
the State, in delegating legislative powers to the Board of Supervisors, has provided
that the members of the Board may be in part appointed and not elected at the
47
polls.
Since this ground-breaking decision similar rulings, invalidating malapportioned
county boards, were made early in 1965 by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex
rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester48 and by a federal district court in New York in Bianchi
v.Griffing 49

It seems clear that within a very few years most county boards in the nation, unless elected at large, will be reapportioned on something approaching a straight
population basis. In the majority of states outside the South county boards traditionally have been elected from districts of unequal population, rather than at-large.
Even those states with a tradition of at-large election of county boards may feel the
impact of the reapportionment rulings-in two ways.
First, the practice of requiring that the board members, although elected at
large, reside for nomination purposes in districts of unequal population, is certain
to be challenged. The practice may very well be voided on the ground that the
from the arithmetic mean of per capita representation, obtained by dividing the total population by the
number of representatives. However, in rectifying this situation it is not at all clear, from the standpoint of "democratic rule" or "fair representation," that all deviations beyond some small percentage
should be deemed bad. To put it another way, if numbers alone are important, how can any deviation
above a miniscule I or 2% be justified? In the majority of states and counties, to get below a 25% or
15s% deviation will require cutting some political subdivision lines. If some must be cut, why not cut
freely and move from a 15% to a io or 5 or I% deviation? In short, there is a real danger, flowing
naturally from the tactics of the struggle and the desire to get a set of districts that will not be nullified
on appeal, that the "mathematical exactness or precision" (377 U.S. 577) which the Court said was
"hardly a workable constitutional requirement" (ibid.) may become the only admissible criterion. See
further discussion in Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle
for Fair Representation, 63 Micn. L. REV. 209 (1964).
"' Supra note 44, at 30-31, manuscript opinion.
,"Id.at 29.
is 132 N.V.2d 249 (Wis. 1965).

"'District Court for the Southern District of New York, Feb. 1, 1965, unreported.
See also the recent developments in California stemming from a 1963 decision in which a reapportionment duty was found in state law, Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Monterey County, 6o Cal. 2d 38,
33 Cal. Reptr. 101, 384 P.2d 421 (1963), compliance action reviewed and sustained in 6o Cal. 2d 751,
36 Cal. Reptr. 66, 388 P.2d 888 (z964), discussed in Gallagher, Apportionment in California Counties:
The Impact of Judicidal Decisions, REPORT No. 6, INSTITUTE OF GOVEREMENTAL AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIF'ORNIA AT DAVIS (x964).
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residence requirement, combined with unequal population among the residence or
"representation" districts, materially narrow the availability of candidates and lessen
the freedom of choice of the county-wide electorate.05
Second, the practice of at-large election itself, although not unconstitutional on
its face, is subject to challenge under a new Supreme Court ruling, Fortson v.
Dorsey,"' if it can be shown that the winner-take-all characteristic of the at-large
election operates regularly to submerge identifiable minority interests. In the Dorsey
case the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Georgia's system of electing seven
state senators at-large from Fulton County (Adanta) for lack of proof of inequity.
But, in a dictum suggesting that the Court may move from a wholly arithmetic
approach to a "representation" approach to apportionment and districting, the Court
52
saiCf:
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment
scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. When this
is demonstrated it will be time enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.
In short, by judicial fiat, and as a totally unexpected by-product of the original
state legislature reapportionment suit from Tennessee in 1962, we may soon have at
hand a ready-made political instrument for "metro" development, in the form of reinvigorated county government, that probably could not have been developed in a
generation of popular referenda. A county board on which all sections of the county
-city, suburban, rural-are represented approximately in proportion to their population, could be a ready-made "metro" instrument. The traditionalist character of the
county should ease the path to acceptability.
A county-centered development also would obviate the need to think along the
lines of more complex borough or "federal" arrangements. A price of most federal
arrangements involving a county and its constituent units is that the constituent
units, as a condition of voluntary adhesion to the organization, demand representation on some unit basis beyond their proportion of the population. The drive fr
"unit" equality rather than numbers equality is as endemic here as in the United
Nations, or in the formative period that produced the Unied States Senate. This
price of unit representation, whatever its political science implications regarding
"' A lower court in Maryland recently dismissed a bill of complaint raising this question and an appeal
was not pressed. Lovell v. Hantske, Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland, Oct. 2, 1964
(unreported). The bill was to enjoin submission to the voters of a new county charter providing that
the seven-member County Council be elected at large but reside in seven districts whose population
ranged from approximately i8,ooo to approximately 35,ooo. The court made an inappropriate analogy
to election of some congressmen at large, where of course there is no subdistrict residence requirement,
and dismissed the bill without serious discussion of the representation problems posed by the new charter
provision.
' 379 U.S. 433 (x965), reversing 228 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 5964).
'Id. at 439.
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"good government," is now apparently unconstitutional under the Reapportionment
Decisions,3 and need be paid no longer.
However, in order to respond to the challenge, there will be a need in some
states to reorganize county government and to expand county home rule powers, as
part 6f the judicially-impelled renascence of the county. This already is sensed in
Michigan and New York. In the former the 1965 program of the state association of

county supervisors includes consideration of both matters and in the latter the state
Office for Local Government, although immediately concerned with county reapportionment, is aware of the larger implications. And significantly, the National
Association of Counties, as if anticipating the corollary opportunities and challenges
that go along with county board reapportionment, made county home rule the theme
for its 1962 meeting and has given it major attention since then.54
At the local level, therefore, unlike the state level, reapportionment may be, and
probably should be, closely intertwined with larger questions of how to re-design
the government structure so that it may better serve its newly homogenized one
man-one vote citizenry. County board reapportionment, particularly in those states

with a tradition of township organization, is a more complex, more challenging, and
potentially more revolutionary process than state legislative reapportionment.
A further reason to look now to the county as the formative instrument for
metropolitan programs is the fact that civic energy, particularly for reform, is

limited. Much of it necesarily will be expended in the process of county board
reapportionment, leaving correspondingly little energy for other local experimentations. 5
" GFor a contrary "hope," see Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 21 (x965). After noting the
difficulties in getting citizen acceptance of federated organizations of metropolitan governments, Professor Weinstein suggests that "the Supreme Court may well find it desirable to allow . . . [unit
representation] in metros by accepting rough approximations to population standards." Id. at 37.
5
'NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNTIES, ACTION PROGRAM FOR HOME RULE (1962). For a recent study of the
related matter of municipal home rule, see NEIL LITrLEFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND
A recent assessment of counties contains this comment: "Instead of
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1962).
dying as the pattern of life that helped create it disappears, the county is becoming an increasingly important unit for provision of social services wanted by what is now essentially an urban public. In metropolitan areas .. .it is becoming the principal unit for the provision of area-wide services. It is far more
acceptable to the general public than is any other general form of metropolitan government." CARLEs R.
A similar assessment
ADRIAN, GOVERNING OUR FIFTY STATES AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 102 (z963).
of counties in metropolitan areas is found in DUANE LocxARD, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 104 (1963): "It is noteworthy that the rise of suburbs has not necessarily sounded the
death-knell but rather has invited a re-examination of the potentialities of county government."
u In a paper by Stuart C. Hall given at a National Municipal League local reapportionment workshop
in San Francisco, November 1964, the emergence of the California county as the focal point for solution
of areawide problems or the construction of a metropolitan form of government was described as follows:
"Here in California, the Legislature repeatedly has draped the 'metropolitan mantle' on the county's
'shoulder.' Planning and zoning; water conservation, distribution and flood control; out-patient mental
health clinics, aid to needy children and medical care for welfare recipients; air and water pollution control; library services; housing and urban renewal; city government by contract with the county; county
service areas-to name but a few of the areas of expanded countywide authority to govern irrespective
of municipal boundaries given to the board of supervisors.
"In short, the trend in this state has been to focus responsibility for the solution of these problems
on the county-to make county government work, and not to create super-metropolitan (sic) except in

NEW CONSTITUTIONAL FoRmuIs FOR METROPOLIS
CONCLUSION

Focusing on the two approaches just analyzed-a council of governments and a
reapportioned county-as solutions to the problem of metropolitan area reorganization is not meant to disparage the plethora of other approaches available, and listed

above. However, few of these other devices have the breadth of purpose and the
political feasibility to warrant viewing them as major avenues toward a metropolitan-area-wide government. At best they can be viewed as supportive measures."
By contrast, a reapportioned county board, with enlarged powers and prestige
commensurate with metropolitan responsibilities, would be a true metropolitan
government. A council of governments, operating both as an action agency and as
an agency to educate local legislators to think in regional terms, can be a natural
stepping stone to a more effective area redistribution of power either within the
county or among counties. As a constitutionalizing process, the potential steppingstone role of the council may be viewed as roughly analogous to the similar role
of the pre-1787 American Confederation which culminated in the re-centralization of
power which we have known since that date as the American Union.
We tend to proliferate governmental forms as we proliferate surplus crops, and
without even the need for a subsidy. Particularly in regard to local governments
we have been, in the words of Robert Buchanan,
A race that binds
Its body in chains and calls them Liberty,
And calls each fresh link Progress.

It is time perhaps now to diminish the number and increase the strength of our local
government links and to forge the big link of metropolitan government in the interest of achieving both the resources for Progress and the pinpointed responsibility
that preserves Liberty.
very limited areas, e.g., air and water pollution and rapid transit. Resistance to multi-purpose super
agencies is determined. They are widely condemned as 'evil' and a 'threat' to, and common enemy of,
the autonomy of the cities and counties. The 'home rule county,' it is said, has been doing, is doing
and should do, the major part of regional government, cancelling 'any need for the controversial and
revolutionary idea of metropolitan supergovernment as a third and new level of local government.' The
California Legislature has expressed its skepticism of any multi-purpose 'metro' plan. Their answer: the
'urban county': reorganized under an administrative officer with more equitable representation on the
county board for the urban populace."
"For example, improved intergovernmental relations will always be important, and have been
called the "hidden dimension" in government. Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman, U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, SUacoasaTTE REPORT ON INTERoOVERNmiENTAL RELATIONS 10 (1963).
But there must also be viable power centers among which effective relations can
develop.
Similarly, in regard to planning, a recent survey found that most planning agencies have insufficient
areal jurisdiction and insufficient power-and those with the least power are those which have fairly
broad areal jurisdiction. U.S. SENATE SuBcoMsMs. ON INTERGOVERNMiENTAL RELATIONS, NATIONAL SURVEY
OF METROPOLITAN PLANNNIo

(x963).
The World Health Organization declared in a recent report that,
next to world peace, metropolitan planning is the most serious single problem for the next half century.
Even as a U.N. agency it properly should have added--"and effective governmental implementation."

